kopia lustrzana https://github.com/thinkst/zippy
248 wiersze
20 KiB
Plaintext
248 wiersze
20 KiB
Plaintext
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The Decline of the Northeastern Ohio Steel Market: Why Did Attempts by Union Leaders and Concerned Citizens to Revive the Steel Industry Ultimately Fail?
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
An Extended Essay in History
|
|||
|
By Philosophy E. Walker
|
|||
|
Candidate Number: xxxxxxxxx
|
|||
|
Supervisor: Alexis Mamaux
|
|||
|
Date: January 12, 2004
|
|||
|
Word Count: 3215
|
|||
|
United World College of the American West
|
|||
|
Montezuma, NM
|
|||
|
87731
|
|||
|
USA
|
|||
|
September 19, 1977 is a date that few people in Youngstown, Ohio will ever forget. On that date Jennings
|
|||
|
Lambeth, president of Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company, announced that most of the steel company’s Campbell
|
|||
|
Works would close. Although for other cities this would simply be a minor economic setback, for the people
|
|||
|
of Youngstown and the surrounding area, it meant disaster. Mahoning County was a one-industry area, and the
|
|||
|
people of Youngstown, Struthers, Campbell, Boardman Township, and the numerous other small towns and
|
|||
|
villages in the area only had one main employer: the steel mills.
|
|||
|
The events that would follow this
|
|||
|
date (known as Black Monday) are seen by the people who witnessed them either as stories of great courage
|
|||
|
and determination or as monuments to human failure and false hope. Rather than sit back and wait for their
|
|||
|
jobs to be snatched away, the workers and local union members in the mills fought long and hard to be able
|
|||
|
to keep the factories open. Petitions, protests, rallies, collectivization, and even the takeover of a steel
|
|||
|
company’s headquarters were all attempted in a desperate movement by those in the industry to preserve the
|
|||
|
only source of employment that this town had. These well-intentioned efforts ultimately failed, leaving
|
|||
|
thousands with shattered dreams and a distinct lack of trust in fellow humankind.
|
|||
|
But why did the
|
|||
|
brave attempts by union leaders and concerned citizens to revive the steel industry ultimately fail? When
|
|||
|
examining the area’s history, culture, and economic situation we can identify four main reasons: the refusal
|
|||
|
of the international leadership of United Steelworkers of America to support their union’s Youngstown
|
|||
|
branch, the lagging international steel market, the lack of a clear, organized vision for individual
|
|||
|
initiatives such as the Save Our Valley Campaign, and crippling regionalism which caused animosity between
|
|||
|
different small towns in the region, all contributed in some way to the failure of the workers and union
|
|||
|
leaders to save the industry. Most importantly, the problem in Youngstown was a nationwide problem. Although
|
|||
|
it affected Youngstown and the surrounding area more than it affected other regions, the local people simply
|
|||
|
could not solve a national crisis on a local level.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
A Brief History of Steel in Northeastern Ohio
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In 1802 James and Daniel Heaton discovered ore and coal lining Yellow Creek in an area outside of Youngstown known as
|
|||
|
Poland Township. Their blast furnace, “Hopewell,” was the very first blast furnace in the area. During the Civil War,
|
|||
|
Youngstown played a vital role in supplying the Union army with iron products. Youngstown also was a major railway
|
|||
|
crossroads, due to its strategic position between Cleveland, Pittsburgh, New York, and Chicago. In fact, “More rail
|
|||
|
cars passed under the Center Street Bridge [a major bridge in Youngstown] per day than any other location in the
|
|||
|
country.”
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
During the 19th century, the center of iron manufacturing had gradually shifted from the far East Coast
|
|||
|
(Massachusetts and Eastern Pennsylvania) to the Ohio Valley Pittsburgh regions of the Northeast, including the Mahoning
|
|||
|
Valley and the Hanging Rock region of Ohio and Kentucky. By 1880, Youngstown’s population had grown to nearly 16,000,
|
|||
|
which meant it had doubled in size over a twenty-year period. The town continued to prosper, driven by the flux of
|
|||
|
immigrants pouring in with the hopes of employment at the mills. This prosperity continued until the late 1920s, when
|
|||
|
the Great Depression hit the area hard. Despite the Congress of Industrial Organization’s successful efforts to
|
|||
|
establish a national steel workers’ union, the industry barely survived the Depression years. Finally, the outbreak of
|
|||
|
the Second World War made iron and steel important again, and Youngstown was bolstered out of its economic standstill
|
|||
|
into a fast-paced period of booming growth.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Youngstown may have been an important and prosperous region in the post-war period, but the seeds for its downfall
|
|||
|
were slowly being sown. Strikes racked the town during the forties, fifties, and sixties, and they were often long and
|
|||
|
bloody. In 1973, the Experimental Negotiating Agreement was signed. This prohibited strikes and lockout, angering
|
|||
|
workers and driving productivity and laborer morale down. At the same time, stricter governmental standards for
|
|||
|
environmental protection and the growth of imported steel were making it harder to produce and market American steel
|
|||
|
parts, and the overeager shareholders in the companies’ stock were pushing for more and more of their share of the pie.
|
|||
|
Most importantly, Youngstown’s steel mills were slowly becoming less efficient and more expensive. Old technology was
|
|||
|
not replaced, obsolete methods were not updated, and almost none of the industry’s profits were being utilized to help
|
|||
|
modernize. It was a recipe for disaster that would soon explode in the faces of hundreds of thousands of workers and
|
|||
|
their families.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Black Monday and the Crash of the Steel Industry
|
|||
|
The announcement of the closing of the mills in 1977 was the beginning of a downward spiral, which would send the
|
|||
|
entire valley into chaos and ruin. Between 1977 and 1981, a total of five mills were closed and approximately 25,000
|
|||
|
jobs were lost countywide. Meetings of union officials and mill bosses were hurriedly set up in an attempt to persuade
|
|||
|
the powers that be to reconsider their statement. However, it was clear that, in the words of USWA president Lloyd
|
|||
|
McBride, “If you can’t make a buck, you get out of the business.”
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The closings meant the end of Youngstown’s only real industry, the end of its population growth, and then end of
|
|||
|
economic progress. Without the mills, people sought other places of employment in adjoining states or even other areas
|
|||
|
of the country. Those that could afford to move did so; those that couldn’t afford to move mostly ended up on the
|
|||
|
streets. Without an industrial or a residential base, commerce shrank considerably. It was becoming increasingly clear
|
|||
|
that without the industrial base provided by the mills, the city of Youngstown would soon become a ghost town, inhabited
|
|||
|
by those too poor or hopeful to escape. The workers decided they needed to do something to save their city, and so they
|
|||
|
mobilized in a variety of ways.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Attempts to Save the Mills
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The very first thing that the workers could do was “to get up a petition to stop the shutdown,” says Ed Mann, a local
|
|||
|
union leader and organizer. The petition was circulated, eventually including thousands of signatures; it was then
|
|||
|
given to USWA representatives to present to President Carter in Washington. However, the representatives were shunted to
|
|||
|
the side and ignored in Washington, since Youngstown’s political influence had died with its industry.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The International chapter of the USWA had much more lobbying power, but they refused to support the local union
|
|||
|
members. The petition was lost among paperwork and bureaucratic procedure.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Next, workers decided to form the Ecumenical Coalition, an organization of local religious groups which spearheaded
|
|||
|
the attempt to reopen the Youngstown works. The Coalition drafter letters to the Lykes Company asking if a group of
|
|||
|
workers might purchase the mill and run it collectively. Lykes ignored the letters, so the Coalition turned once again
|
|||
|
to the federal government. Here, too, they were ignored. The Coalition had no proper funds to buy the mills, so they
|
|||
|
could do nothing but sit back and watch as the mills closed.
|
|||
|
Finally, following the shutdown of US Steel’s plant in 1980, local union leaders congregated outside the US Steel
|
|||
|
Headquarters in Youngstown. They invited local people and politicians to witness the scene, then charged the
|
|||
|
Headquarters and took it over. The workers stayed there until the next day, when US Steel declared that they were ready
|
|||
|
to talk about selling the mill. Immediately after the workers left the building, US steel representatives told the local
|
|||
|
union leaders that they had changed their minds and were no longer interested in allowing the workers to purchase the
|
|||
|
mill.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
All these efforts eventually came to nothing, and Youngstown’s steel mills remained closed. These attempts to save
|
|||
|
the mills were hindered by several major factors, including the decline of the world steel market, which made American
|
|||
|
steel impossible to sell or export.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The Decline of the World Market
|
|||
|
The efforts to save the mills failed partly because the international market for steel had largely dried up. During
|
|||
|
World War II the rest of the world was hungry for America’s iron and steel products; however, by the seventies no
|
|||
|
foreign nations needed to import steel in such large quantities. In fact, American steel imports were beginning to
|
|||
|
outweigh exports.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Foreign steel was easier and more efficient to make, and was often of higher quality than domestic steel. Foreign
|
|||
|
steel companies invested in their factories, updating their technology and replacing their equipment often. This meant
|
|||
|
that foreign facilities were more modern and efficient than any plants in America, and therefore were able to export a
|
|||
|
more competitive product.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Foreign steel was also much cheaper. Wage hikes, although they helped to improve living conditions of steel workers
|
|||
|
in the US, made American steel far more expensive. Also, international competitors drew on a large supply of very cheap
|
|||
|
labor. Jobs were scarce in other steel-exporting countries, and labor laws were either non-existent or allowed employers
|
|||
|
to pay much less for work. Labor costs in America continued to go up, draining US companies of their resources, while
|
|||
|
companies overseas were able to cut labor costs and put that money back into updating and renovating their facilities.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
On a worldwide scale, newer materials such as aluminum, plastic, and composites were beginning to substitute steel
|
|||
|
both at home and abroad. Steel demand worldwide was beginning to decline, and it affected both domestic and foreign
|
|||
|
companies. However, to American companies already suffering financial setbacks, outdated machinery, and fierce
|
|||
|
competition, this lack of demand was an inconvenience they could not afford. America’s steel remained unsold, flooding
|
|||
|
the world market with inferior products that no one wanted to buy.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Since this problem was a national one rather than a local one, the problems that were occurring in Youngstown were
|
|||
|
not unique. Youngstown was perhaps hit harder than any other town by the collapse of the steel industry, but it was not
|
|||
|
alone. The problem was a national one, involving many more mills and issues than Youngstown’s alone. J. Philip Richley,
|
|||
|
a union member and organizer of many attempts to save 5the mills, has summed it up thus: “You just can’t solve a
|
|||
|
nation-wide problem in a single city.” The decline of the world steel market affected not just Youngstown but the
|
|||
|
entire steel community in America. Trying to prop up one city’s mills was impossible when faced with the depression that
|
|||
|
spread throughout the entire industry.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The Save Our Valley Campaign: Lack of Funds and Plans
|
|||
|
Eventually, some religious leaders involved in the Ecumenical Coalition joined forces within community members and
|
|||
|
former steel mill employees to create the Save Our Valley Campaign. As the name suggests, local leaders wanted to
|
|||
|
instill the people of Youngstown with a fierce sense of urgency, driving them forward to confront steel companies and
|
|||
|
owners and help secure the future of the region. Marches, speeches, and letter writing were all employed to help
|
|||
|
stimulate the Campaign and rally the people.
|
|||
|
But the Campaign was bogged down heavily by the lack of proper funding. The people of Youngstown, being now
|
|||
|
unemployed had very little money to spend on anything but staying alive. College tuition, clothes, food, and heating all
|
|||
|
had to come before donations to non-profit organizations. People outside of the area had no personal investment in the
|
|||
|
mills, and so it was difficult to convince anyone from out of the county to contribute funds. The lack of money proved
|
|||
|
to be crippling, because it prevented the organizations involved from purchasing the mills to run collectively. Without
|
|||
|
funds, the Save Our Valley Campaign could do nothing major to help salvage the city’s dying economy.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The Save Our Valley Campaign also lacked one essential component: an actual concrete plan. No one seemed to know
|
|||
|
just how to go about fixing the problems. Letters and petitions were all very well, but they did little to improve the
|
|||
|
situation. People clung to vague ideas of worker collectivization, but no one could really fathom exactly how that would
|
|||
|
work; the people of Youngstown were, after all, not particularly familiar with socialism or collectivization in general.
|
|||
|
Beyond that, no one knew how they should proceed: everyone knew that saving the mills was important, but nobody stepped
|
|||
|
forward with a full-fledged plan to do it without losing huge amounts of money and dragging even more people down.
|
|||
|
Without a real plan, nothing could truly be achieved.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Without funds to drive the efforts, or even a real plan of action, the Save Our Valley Campaign did more harm than
|
|||
|
good. In effect, it raised the hopes of workers without having any real chance at saving anything. People became excited
|
|||
|
and waited for the mills to reappear, but they never did. The Campaign failed to save any jobs and Youngstown was
|
|||
|
plunged into economic chaos.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The Apathy of USWA
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
United Steel Workers of America was the union representing the Youngstown steel workers when the closings hit.
|
|||
|
Initially many assumed that their union would take a lead role in fighting for the recovery of their jobs. However, it
|
|||
|
soon became clear that although the local union leaders were prepared to fight, the international branch was not. The
|
|||
|
higher levels of the union became increasingly disassociated with Youngstown and its plight, attempting to shut out the
|
|||
|
appeals from workers and local union representatives and to ignore what was really happening.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Actually, one main reason for the behavior of the USWA was that union leaders really had no idea what to do. No one
|
|||
|
had ever seen a shutdown of this magnitude and rapidity before, and none of the leaders of USWA, not even president Lynn
|
|||
|
Williams, knew what could be done. It was clear to everyone that the economic fallout from this series of closings
|
|||
|
would be one of the worst in US history, and so without any real precedents the union leaders were flustered. Rather
|
|||
|
than try and come up with some sort of scenario, the USWA simply ignored what was going on in Youngstown, hoping that
|
|||
|
perhaps the problem would resolve itself, or at least not spread any further than it already had.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Besides incompetence, the USWA had one other major reason for rejecting their local counterpart: fear of socialism.
|
|||
|
Obviously the union itself was not afraid of socialist action, but they worried that the federal government might see
|
|||
|
the efforts of Youngstown workers to collectivize as a movement towards socialism and perhaps even communism. If the
|
|||
|
USWA supported the efforts to revive the mills and encouraged worker control and ownership of the factories, then the
|
|||
|
government (and potentially other important people and institutions as well) might begin to think that the UWSA leaders
|
|||
|
were encouraging socialism. This would mean that UWSA would lose credibility with the American government and its
|
|||
|
people, something they could not afford to do. Therefore, they decided to withdraw support and let the local branch
|
|||
|
fight it out alone.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Regionalism
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
From its very first days the Mahoning Valley has been an area packed with small villages and hamlets. Youngstown is the
|
|||
|
name of the major city area, but surrounding it on all sides are small communities which to the casual viewer are
|
|||
|
indistinguishable from the main city itself. Boardman, Poland Township, Struthers, Lowellville, Warren, Lordstown,
|
|||
|
Canfield, Niles, and many other towns and districts are crowded around Youngstown (see Figure 3). People from each town
|
|||
|
work, shop, eat, and socialize in towns separate from their own, making each town strongly dependent on every other
|
|||
|
town. However, although traffic is heavy between each separate district, each area has its own distinct cultural
|
|||
|
ethnicity, educational system, heritage, history, and even food. For example, Struthers is a poor town with a large
|
|||
|
Slovak population, where education is generally better than in surrounding towns, but unemployment is much higher and
|
|||
|
pollution is widespread. Most people in Struthers are either Orthodox or Baptist. Two blocks over one finds Boardman, a
|
|||
|
well-off township with a reputation for rich but unsuccessful schools. Its residents are mainly Italian and Roman
|
|||
|
Catholic, with a small concentration of Methodists on the east side. Unemployment is low in comparison with surrounding
|
|||
|
towns, and the streets are clean and well kept. With many more cultures, religions, and economic levels living in close
|
|||
|
proximity to one another, a curious phenomenon has overtaken the area: regionalism. Each town, with their own identity,
|
|||
|
instills a strong regionalistic feeling within their respective populations, which dictates many habits, exchanges, and
|
|||
|
interactions between populations. Oftentimes this regionalism takes the form of bizarre forms of hatred, with certain
|
|||
|
towns becoming sworn enemies of others.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
With so much regional tension, it became very hard for workers to unite under a common cause, even one that would
|
|||
|
save their jobs and their futures. Workers from Poland Township would refuse to attend rallies with workers from
|
|||
|
Campbell, and citizens of Struthers would become suspicious of people from Boardman, even if they were supposed to be
|
|||
|
working towards the same thing. A lack of cooperation became a crippling problem for the movement, because no one was
|
|||
|
willing to put aside regional differences to work together. In some instances, small companies would express interest in
|
|||
|
helping the movement or in relocating their business in the area, but because of regional pride no one could ever agree
|
|||
|
where the new businesses should relocate. In this way the people of the Mahoning Valley missed many opportunities for
|
|||
|
new industrial or commercial lifeblood because of arbitrary arguments where the goal was simply to protect regional
|
|||
|
pride.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Conclusion: The Aftershock and the Significance of Black Monday
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Black Monday was a devastating blow to an entire generation of people. The efforts to avoid catastrophe after the fact
|
|||
|
were unsuccessful for four main reasons: the failure of the international steel market, the lack of funds and plans in
|
|||
|
initiatives such as the Save Our Valley Campaign, the refusal of the USWA to support their local chapter out of
|
|||
|
ineptitude and fear, and the absurd but very real regionalism which corrupted solidarity efforts and drove away any hope
|
|||
|
for brining in new companies.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
What happened in Youngstown may not seem significant on an international or even on a national level, and perhaps it
|
|||
|
is not. But to the thousands of people living there, the loss of the mills was a devastating event that sent shock waves
|
|||
|
through their economic, political, and social futures. Because of the mills and their conspicuous absence, hundreds of
|
|||
|
people were uprooted, forced to leave their homes and tightly knit communities. Hundreds more joined the unemployment
|
|||
|
lines, or even began living on the streets. For the people of Youngstown, Black Monday was not just a historical event-
|
|||
|
it was the most important event in their lives.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The steel workers who tried to save their jobs and their lives were part of something greater than themselves, something
|
|||
|
which would endure long after they had moved away and moved on. Even though they eventually failed, the fact that they
|
|||
|
tried to preserve what they felt belonged to them is an amazing example of how far people will go to save their lives
|
|||
|
and the futures of their children.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|