refactor credMgmt to parse as subCommandParams, and get ready for delete command

pull/404/head
Conor Patrick 2020-03-24 15:07:10 -04:00
rodzic a28a05673f
commit 682a443f4e
3 zmienionych plików z 72 dodań i 32 usunięć

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@ -382,6 +382,19 @@ static void ctap_increment_rk_store()
STATE.rk_stored++;
ctap_flush_state();
}
static void ctap_decrement_rk_store()
{
STATE.rk_stored--;
ctap_flush_state();
}
// Return 1 if rk is valid, 0 if not.
static int ctap_rk_is_valid(CTAP_residentKey * rk)
{
return (rk->id.count > 0 && rk->id.count != 0xffffffff);
}
static int is_matching_rk(CTAP_residentKey * rk, CTAP_residentKey * rk2)
{
@ -1121,9 +1134,13 @@ int ctap_filter_invalid_credentials(CTAP_getAssertion * GA)
crypto_sha256_final(rpIdHash);
printf1(TAG_GREEN, "true rpIdHash: "); dump_hex1(TAG_GREEN, rpIdHash, 32);
for(i = 0; i < STATE.rk_stored; i++)
for(i = 0; i < ctap_rk_size(); i++)
{
ctap_load_rk(i, &rk);
if (! ctap_rk_is_valid(&rk)) {
continue;
}
printf1(TAG_GREEN, "rpIdHash%d: ", i); dump_hex1(TAG_GREEN, rk.id.rpIdHash, 32);
int protection_status =
@ -1454,31 +1471,17 @@ uint8_t ctap_cred_rk(CborEncoder * encoder, int rk_ind, int rk_count)
uint8_t ctap_cred_mgmt_pinauth(CTAP_credMgmt *CM)
{
uint8_t ret = 0;
if (CM->cmd != CM_cmdMetadata && CM->cmd != CM_cmdRPBegin && CM->cmd != CM_cmdRKBegin)
if (CM->cmd != CM_cmdMetadata &&
CM->cmd != CM_cmdRPBegin &&
CM->cmd != CM_cmdRKBegin &&
CM->cmd != CM_cmdRKDelete)
{
// pinAuth is not required for other commands
return 0;
}
if (CM->pinProtocol != 1)
{
return CTAP1_ERR_OTHER;
}
if (CM->cmd == CM_cmdMetadata || CM->cmd == CM_cmdRPBegin)
{
uint8_t cmd = (uint8_t) CM->cmd;
ret = verify_pin_auth_ex(CM->pinAuth, &cmd, 1);
}
else if (CM->cmd == CM_cmdRKBegin)
{
uint8_t params[5 + sizeof(CM->rpIdHash)] = {CM->cmd, 0xa1, 0x01, 0x58, 0x20};
if (CM->pinProtocol != 1)
{
return CTAP1_ERR_OTHER;
}
memcpy(&params[5], CM->rpIdHash, sizeof(CM->rpIdHash));
ret = verify_pin_auth_ex(CM->pinAuth, params, sizeof(params));
}
int8_t ret = verify_pin_auth_ex(CM->pinAuth, (uint8_t*)&CM->hashed, CM->subCommandParamsCborSize + 1);
if (ret == CTAP2_ERR_PIN_AUTH_INVALID)
{
ctap_decrement_pin_attempts();
@ -1492,6 +1495,7 @@ uint8_t ctap_cred_mgmt_pinauth(CTAP_credMgmt *CM)
{
ctap_reset_pin_attempts();
}
return ret;
}
@ -1539,7 +1543,7 @@ uint8_t ctap_cred_mgmt(CborEncoder * encoder, uint8_t * request, int length)
rk_auth = true;
rp_auth = false;
// store the specified hash, we will need it for CM_cmdRKNext
memcpy(rpIdHash, CM.rpIdHash, 32);
memcpy(rpIdHash, CM.subCommandParams.rpIdHash, 32);
// count how many RKs have this hash
for (i = 0; i < STATE.rk_stored; i++)
{
@ -1601,6 +1605,8 @@ uint8_t ctap_cred_mgmt(CborEncoder * encoder, uint8_t * request, int length)
check_ret(ret);
curr_rk_ind++;
break;
case CM_cmdRKDelete:
break;
default:
printf2(TAG_ERR, "error, invalid credMgmt cmd: 0x%02x\n", CM.cmd);
return CTAP1_ERR_INVALID_COMMAND;

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@ -44,7 +44,10 @@
#define CM_cmdRPNext 0x03
#define CM_cmdRKBegin 0x04
#define CM_cmdRKNext 0x05
#define CM_rpIdHash 0x02
#define CM_cmdRKDelete 0x06
#define CM_subCommandParams 0x02
#define CM_subCommandRpId 0x01
#define CM_subCommandCred 0x02
#define CM_pinProtocol 0x03
#define CM_pinAuth 0x04
@ -311,7 +314,17 @@ typedef struct
typedef struct
{
int cmd;
uint8_t rpIdHash[32];
struct {
uint8_t rpIdHash[32];
CTAP_credentialDescriptor credentialDescriptor;
} subCommandParams;
struct {
uint8_t cmd;
uint8_t subCommandParamsCborCopy[sizeof(CTAP_credentialDescriptor) + 16];
} hashed;
uint32_t subCommandParamsCborSize;
uint8_t pinAuth[16];
uint8_t pinAuthPresent;
int pinProtocol;

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@ -1007,7 +1007,7 @@ uint8_t parse_allow_list(CTAP_getAssertion * GA, CborValue * it)
return 0;
}
static uint8_t parse_rpid_hash(CborValue * val, CTAP_credMgmt * CM)
static uint8_t parse_cred_mgmt_subcommandparams(CborValue * val, CTAP_credMgmt * CM)
{
size_t map_length;
int key;
@ -1022,8 +1022,12 @@ static uint8_t parse_rpid_hash(CborValue * val, CTAP_credMgmt * CM)
return CTAP2_ERR_INVALID_CBOR_TYPE;
}
ret = cbor_value_enter_container(val,&map);
check_ret(ret);
const uint8_t * start_byte = cbor_value_get_next_byte(&map) - 1;
ret = cbor_value_get_map_length(val, &map_length);
check_ret(ret);
@ -1040,8 +1044,8 @@ static uint8_t parse_rpid_hash(CborValue * val, CTAP_credMgmt * CM)
check_ret(ret);
switch(key)
{
case 1:
ret = cbor_value_copy_byte_string(&map, CM->rpIdHash, &sz, NULL);
case CM_subCommandRpId:
ret = cbor_value_copy_byte_string(&map, CM->subCommandParams.rpIdHash, &sz, NULL);
if (ret == CborErrorOutOfMemory)
{
printf2(TAG_ERR,"Error, map key is too large\n");
@ -1049,10 +1053,26 @@ static uint8_t parse_rpid_hash(CborValue * val, CTAP_credMgmt * CM)
}
check_ret(ret);
break;
case CM_subCommandCred:
ret = parse_credential_descriptor(&map, &CM->subCommandParams.credentialDescriptor);
check_ret(ret);;
break;
}
ret = cbor_value_advance(&map);
check_ret(ret);
}
const uint8_t * end_byte = cbor_value_get_next_byte(&map);
uint32_t length = (uint32_t)end_byte - (uint32_t)start_byte;
if (length > sizeof(CM->hashed.subCommandParamsCborCopy))
{
return CTAP2_ERR_LIMIT_EXCEEDED;
}
// Copy the details that were hashed so they can be verified later.
memmove(CM->hashed.subCommandParamsCborCopy, start_byte, length);
CM->subCommandParamsCborSize = length;
return 0;
}
@ -1076,6 +1096,7 @@ uint8_t ctap_parse_cred_mgmt(CTAP_credMgmt * CM, uint8_t * request, int length)
return CTAP2_ERR_INVALID_CBOR_TYPE;
}
ret = cbor_value_enter_container(&it,&map);
check_ret(ret);
@ -1106,17 +1127,17 @@ uint8_t ctap_parse_cred_mgmt(CTAP_credMgmt * CM, uint8_t * request, int length)
{
ret = cbor_value_get_int_checked(&map, &CM->cmd);
check_ret(ret);
CM->hashed.cmd = CM->cmd;
}
else
{
return CTAP2_ERR_INVALID_CBOR_TYPE;
}
break;
case CM_rpIdHash:
printf1(TAG_CM, "CM_rpIdHash\n");
ret = parse_rpid_hash(&map, CM);
case CM_subCommandParams:
printf1(TAG_CM, "CM_subCommandParams\n");
ret = parse_cred_mgmt_subcommandparams(&map, CM);
check_ret(ret);
dump_hex1(TAG_CM, CM->rpIdHash, 32);
break;
case CM_pinProtocol:
printf1(TAG_CM, "CM_pinProtocol\n");