kopia lustrzana https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf
242 wiersze
7.7 KiB
C
242 wiersze
7.7 KiB
C
/*
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* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2018-2022 Espressif Systems (Shanghai) CO LTD
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*
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
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*/
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#include <string.h>
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#include <stdbool.h>
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#include "esp_crt_bundle.h"
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#include "esp_log.h"
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#define BUNDLE_HEADER_OFFSET 2
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#define CRT_HEADER_OFFSET 4
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static const char *TAG = "esp-x509-crt-bundle";
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/* a dummy certificate so that
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* cacert_ptr passes non-NULL check during handshake */
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static mbedtls_x509_crt s_dummy_crt;
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extern const uint8_t x509_crt_imported_bundle_bin_start[] asm("_binary_x509_crt_bundle_start");
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extern const uint8_t x509_crt_imported_bundle_bin_end[] asm("_binary_x509_crt_bundle_end");
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typedef struct crt_bundle_t {
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const uint8_t **crts;
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uint16_t num_certs;
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size_t x509_crt_bundle_len;
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} crt_bundle_t;
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static crt_bundle_t s_crt_bundle;
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static int esp_crt_check_signature(mbedtls_x509_crt *child, const uint8_t *pub_key_buf, size_t pub_key_len);
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static int esp_crt_check_signature(mbedtls_x509_crt *child, const uint8_t *pub_key_buf, size_t pub_key_len)
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{
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int ret = 0;
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mbedtls_x509_crt parent;
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const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
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unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
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mbedtls_x509_crt_init(&parent);
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if ( (ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(&parent.pk, pub_key_buf, pub_key_len) ) != 0) {
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ESP_LOGE(TAG, "PK parse failed with error %X", ret);
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goto cleanup;
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}
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// Fast check to avoid expensive computations when not necessary
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if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(&parent.pk, child->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_pk))) {
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ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Simple compare failed");
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ret = -1;
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goto cleanup;
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}
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md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(child->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_md));
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if ( (ret = mbedtls_md( md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash )) != 0 ) {
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ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Internal mbedTLS error %X", ret);
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goto cleanup;
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}
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if ( (ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( child->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_pk), child->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_opts), &parent.pk,
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child->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_md), hash, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ),
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child->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig).p, child->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig).len )) != 0 ) {
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ESP_LOGE(TAG, "PK verify failed with error %X", ret);
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goto cleanup;
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}
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cleanup:
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mbedtls_x509_crt_free(&parent);
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return ret;
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}
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/* This callback is called for every certificate in the chain. If the chain
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* is proper each intermediate certificate is validated through its parent
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* in the x509_crt_verify_chain() function. So this callback should
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* only verify the first untrusted link in the chain is signed by the
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* root certificate in the trusted bundle
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*/
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int esp_crt_verify_callback(void *buf, mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, int depth, uint32_t *flags)
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{
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mbedtls_x509_crt *child = crt;
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/* It's OK for a trusted cert to have a weak signature hash alg.
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as we already trust this certificate */
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uint32_t flags_filtered = *flags & ~(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD);
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if (flags_filtered != MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED) {
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return 0;
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}
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if (s_crt_bundle.crts == NULL) {
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ESP_LOGE(TAG, "No certificates in bundle");
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return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR;
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}
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ESP_LOGD(TAG, "%d certificates in bundle", s_crt_bundle.num_certs);
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size_t name_len = 0;
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const uint8_t *crt_name;
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bool crt_found = false;
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int start = 0;
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int end = s_crt_bundle.num_certs - 1;
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int middle = (end - start) / 2;
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/* Look for the certificate using binary search on subject name */
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while (start <= end) {
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name_len = s_crt_bundle.crts[middle][0] << 8 | s_crt_bundle.crts[middle][1];
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crt_name = s_crt_bundle.crts[middle] + CRT_HEADER_OFFSET;
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int cmp_res = memcmp(child->issuer_raw.p, crt_name, name_len );
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if (cmp_res == 0) {
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crt_found = true;
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break;
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} else if (cmp_res < 0) {
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end = middle - 1;
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} else {
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start = middle + 1;
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}
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middle = (start + end) / 2;
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}
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int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR;
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if (crt_found) {
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size_t key_len = s_crt_bundle.crts[middle][2] << 8 | s_crt_bundle.crts[middle][3];
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ret = esp_crt_check_signature(child, s_crt_bundle.crts[middle] + CRT_HEADER_OFFSET + name_len, key_len);
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}
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if (ret == 0) {
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ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Certificate validated");
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*flags = 0;
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return 0;
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}
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ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Failed to verify certificate");
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return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR;
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}
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/* Initialize the bundle into an array so we can do binary search for certs,
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the bundle generated by the python utility is already presorted by subject name
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*/
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static esp_err_t esp_crt_bundle_init(const uint8_t *x509_bundle, size_t bundle_size)
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{
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if (bundle_size < BUNDLE_HEADER_OFFSET + CRT_HEADER_OFFSET) {
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ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Invalid certificate bundle");
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return ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG;
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}
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uint16_t num_certs = (x509_bundle[0] << 8) | x509_bundle[1];
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if (num_certs > CONFIG_MBEDTLS_CERTIFICATE_BUNDLE_MAX_CERTS) {
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ESP_LOGE(TAG, "No. of certs in the certificate bundle = %d exceeds\n"
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"Max allowed certificates in the certificate bundle = %d\n"
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"Please update the menuconfig option with appropriate value", num_certs, CONFIG_MBEDTLS_CERTIFICATE_BUNDLE_MAX_CERTS);
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return ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG;
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}
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const uint8_t **crts = calloc(num_certs, sizeof(x509_bundle));
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if (crts == NULL) {
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ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Unable to allocate memory for bundle");
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return ESP_ERR_NO_MEM;
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}
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const uint8_t *cur_crt;
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/* This is the maximum region that is allowed to access */
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const uint8_t *bundle_end = x509_bundle + bundle_size;
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cur_crt = x509_bundle + BUNDLE_HEADER_OFFSET;
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for (int i = 0; i < num_certs; i++) {
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crts[i] = cur_crt;
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if (cur_crt + CRT_HEADER_OFFSET > bundle_end) {
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ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Invalid certificate bundle");
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free(crts);
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return ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG;
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}
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size_t name_len = cur_crt[0] << 8 | cur_crt[1];
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size_t key_len = cur_crt[2] << 8 | cur_crt[3];
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cur_crt = cur_crt + CRT_HEADER_OFFSET + name_len + key_len;
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}
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if (cur_crt > bundle_end) {
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ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Invalid certificate bundle");
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free(crts);
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return ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG;
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}
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/* The previous crt bundle is only updated when initialization of the
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* current crt_bundle is successful */
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/* Free previous crt_bundle */
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free(s_crt_bundle.crts);
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s_crt_bundle.num_certs = num_certs;
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s_crt_bundle.crts = crts;
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return ESP_OK;
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}
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esp_err_t esp_crt_bundle_attach(void *conf)
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{
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esp_err_t ret = ESP_OK;
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// If no bundle has been set by the user then use the bundle embedded in the binary
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if (s_crt_bundle.crts == NULL) {
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ret = esp_crt_bundle_init(x509_crt_imported_bundle_bin_start, x509_crt_imported_bundle_bin_end - x509_crt_imported_bundle_bin_start);
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}
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if (ret != ESP_OK) {
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ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Failed to attach bundle");
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return ret;
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}
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if (conf) {
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/* point to a dummy certificate
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* This is only required so that the
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* cacert_ptr passes non-NULL check during handshake
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*/
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mbedtls_ssl_config *ssl_conf = (mbedtls_ssl_config *)conf;
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mbedtls_x509_crt_init(&s_dummy_crt);
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mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain(ssl_conf, &s_dummy_crt, NULL);
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mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify(ssl_conf, esp_crt_verify_callback, NULL);
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}
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return ret;
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}
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void esp_crt_bundle_detach(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf)
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{
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free(s_crt_bundle.crts);
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s_crt_bundle.crts = NULL;
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if (conf) {
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mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify(conf, NULL, NULL);
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}
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}
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esp_err_t esp_crt_bundle_set(const uint8_t *x509_bundle, size_t bundle_size)
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{
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return esp_crt_bundle_init(x509_bundle, bundle_size);
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}
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