esp-idf/components/esp_hw_support/include/esp_fault.h

100 wiersze
4.0 KiB
C

// Copyright 2020 Espressif Systems (Shanghai) PTE LTD
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
#include "sdkconfig.h"
#include "soc/rtc_cntl_reg.h"
#include "esp_rom_sys.h"
#pragma once
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
/**
* @brief Assert a condition is true, in a way that should be resistant to fault injection for
* single fault attacks.
*
* - Expands CONDITION multiple times (condition must have no side effects)
* - Compiler is told all registers are invalid before evaluating CONDITION each time, to avoid a fault
* causing a misread of a register used in all three evaluations of CONDITION.
* - If CONDITION is ever false, a system reset is triggered.
*
* @note Place this macro after a "normal" check of CONDITION that will fail with a normal error
* message. This is the fallback in case a fault injection attack skips or corrupts the result of
* that check. (Although ensure that an attacker can't use fault injection to skip past the "normal"
* error message, to avoid this check entirely.)
*
* @note This macro increases binary size and is slow and should be used sparingly.
*
* @note This macro does not guarantee fault injection resistance. In particular CONDITION must be
* chosen carefully - a fault injection attack which sets CONDITION to true will not be detected by
* this macro. Care must also be taken that an attacker can't use a fault to completely bypass calling
* whatever function tests ESP_FAULT_ASSERT.
*
* @note This is difficult to debug as a failure triggers an instant software reset, and UART output
* is often truncated (as FIFO is not flushed). Define the ESP_FAULT_ASSERT_DEBUG macro to debug any
* failures of this macro due to software bugs.
*
* @param CONDITION A condition which will evaluate true unless an attacker used fault injection to skip or corrupt some other critical system calculation.
*
*/
#define ESP_FAULT_ASSERT(CONDITION) do { \
asm volatile ("" ::: "memory"); \
if(!(CONDITION)) _ESP_FAULT_RESET(); \
asm volatile ("" ::: "memory"); \
if(!(CONDITION)) _ESP_FAULT_RESET(); \
asm volatile ("" ::: "memory"); \
if(!(CONDITION)) _ESP_FAULT_RESET(); \
} while(0)
#ifndef CONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ARCH_RISCV
#define _ESP_FAULT_ILLEGAL_INSTRUCTION asm volatile("ill.n; ill.n; ill.n; ill.n; ill.n; ill.n; ill.n;")
#else
#define _ESP_FAULT_ILLEGAL_INSTRUCTION asm volatile("unimp; unimp; unimp; unimp; unimp;")
#endif
// Uncomment this macro to get debug output if ESP_FAULT_ASSERT() fails
//
// Note that uncommenting this macro reduces the anti-FI effectiveness
//
//#define ESP_FAULT_ASSERT_DEBUG
/* Internal macro, purpose is to trigger a system reset if an inconsistency due to fault injection
is detected.
Illegal instruction opcodes are there as a fallback to crash the CPU in case it doesn't
reset as expected.
*/
#ifndef ESP_FAULT_ASSERT_DEBUG
#define _ESP_FAULT_RESET() do { \
REG_WRITE(RTC_CNTL_OPTIONS0_REG, RTC_CNTL_SW_SYS_RST); \
_ESP_FAULT_ILLEGAL_INSTRUCTION; \
} while(0)
#else // ESP_FAULT_ASSERT_DEBUG
#warning "Enabling ESP_FAULT_ASSERT_DEBUG makes ESP_FAULT_ASSERT() less effective"
#define _ESP_FAULT_RESET() do { \
esp_rom_printf("ESP_FAULT_ASSERT %s:%d\n", __FILE__, __LINE__); \
_ESP_FAULT_ILLEGAL_INSTRUCTION; \
} while(0)
#endif // ESP_FAULT_ASSERT_DEBUG
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif