Flash Encryption is a feature for encrypting the contents of the ESP32's attached SPI flash. When flash encryption is enabled, physical readout of the SPI flash is not sufficient to recover most flash contents.
Flash Encryption is separate from the :doc:`Secure Boot <secure-boot>` feature, and you can use flash encryption without enabling secure boot. However we recommend using both features together for a secure environment.
**IMPORTANT: Enabling flash encryption limits your options for further updates of your ESP32. Make sure to read this document (including :ref:`flash-encryption-limitations`) and understand the implications of enabling flash encryption.**
- The contents of the flash are encrypted using AES with a 256 bit key. The flash encryption key is stored in efuse internal to the chip, and is (by default) protected from software access.
- Flash access is transparent via the flash cache mapping feature of ESP32 - any flash regions which are mapped to the address space will be transparently decrypted when read.
- Encryption is applied by flashing the ESP32 with plaintext data, and (if encryption is enabled) the bootloader encrypts the data in place on first boot.
- Not all of the flash is encrypted. The following kinds of flash data are encrypted:
- Secure boot bootloader digest (if secure boot is enabled)
- Partition Table
- All "app" type partitions
- Any partition marked with the "encrypt" flag in the partition table
It may be desirable for some data partitions to remain unencrypted for ease of access, or to use flash-friendly update algorithms that are ineffective if the data is encrypted. "NVS" partitions for non-volatile storage cannot be encrypted.
- The flash encryption key is stored in efuse key block 1, internal to the ESP32 chip. By default, this key is read- and write-protected so software cannot access it or change it.
- The `flash encryption algorithm` is AES-256, where the key is "tweaked" with the offset address of each 32 byte block of flash. This means every 32 byte block (two consecutive 16 byte AES blocks) is encrypted with a unique key derived from the flash encryption key.
- Although software running on the chip can transparently decrypt flash contents, by default it is made impossible for the UART bootloader to decrypt (or encrypt) data when flash encryption is enabled.
- If flash encrption may be enabled, the programmer must take certain precautions when writing code that :ref:`uses encrypted flash <using-encrypted-flash>`.
This is the default (and recommended) flash encryption initialisation process. It is possible to customise this process for development or other purposes, see :ref:`flash-encryption-advanced-features` for details.
**IMPORTANT: Once flash encryption is enabled on first boot, the hardware allows a maximum of 3 subsequent flash updates via serial re-flashing.** A special procedure (documented in :ref:`updating-encrypted-flash-serial`) must be followed to perform these updates.
- If secure boot is enabled, no physical re-flashes are possible.
- OTA updates can be used to update flash content without counting towards this limit.
- When enabling flash encryption in development, use a `pregenerated flash encryption key` to allow physically re-flashing an unlimited number of times with pre-encrypted data.**
- The bootloader must be compiled with flash encryption support enabled. In ``make menuconfig``, navigate to "Security Features" and select "Yes" for "Enable flash encryption on boot".
- If enabling Secure Boot at the same time, it is best to simultaneously select those options now. Read the :doc:`Secure Boot <secure-boot>` documentation first.
- On first boot, the bootloader sees :ref:`FLASH_CRYPT_CNT` is set to 0 (factory default) so it generates a flash encryption key using the hardware random number generator. This key is stored in efuse. The key is read and write protected against further software access.
- All of the encrypted partitions are then encrypted in-place by the bootloader. Encrypting in-place can take some time (up to a minute for large partitions.)
**IMPORTANT: Do not interrupt power to the ESP32 while the first boot encryption pass is running. If power is interrupted, the flash contents will be corrupted and require flashing with unencrypted data again. A reflash like this will not count towards the flashing limit.**
- Once flashing is complete. efuses are blown (by default) to disable encrypted flash access while the UART bootloader is running. See :ref:`uart-bootloader-encryption` for advanced details.
- The ``FLASH_CRYPT_CONFIG`` efuse is also burned to the maximum value (``0xF``) to maximise the number of key bits which are tweaked in the flash algorithm. See :ref:`setting-flash-crypt-config` for advanced details.
- Finally, the :ref:`FLASH_CRYPT_CNT` is burned with the initial value 1. It is this efuse which activates the transparent flash encryption layer, and limits the number of subsequent reflashes. See the :ref:`updating-encrypted-flash` section for details about :ref:`FLASH_CRYPT_CNT`.
Once flash encryption is enabled, some care needs to be taken when accessing flash contents from code.
Scope of Flash Encryption
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Whenever the :ref:`FLASH_CRYPT_CNT` is set to a value with an odd number of bits set, all flash content which is accessed via the MMU's flash cache is transparently decrypted. This includes:
- The software bootloader image when it is read by the ROM bootloader.
**IMPORTANT: The MMU flash cache unconditionally decrypts all data. Data which is stored unencrypted in the flash will be "transparently decrypted" via the flash cache and appear to software like random garbage.**
To read data without using a flash cache MMU mapping, we recommend using the partition read function :func:`esp_partition_read`. When using this function, data will only be decrypted when it is read from an encrypted partition. Other partitions will be read unencrypted. In this way, software can access encrypted and non-encrypted flash in the same way.
Where possible, we recommend using the partition write function ``esp_partition_write``. When using this function, data will only be encrypted when writing to encrypted partitions. Data will be written to other partitions unencrypted. In this way, software can access encrypted and non-encrypted flash in the same way.
The ``esp_spi_flash_write`` function will write data when the write_encrypted parameter is set to true. Otherwise, data will be written unencrypted.
The ROM function ``esp_rom_spiflash_write_encrypted`` will write encrypted data to flash, the ROM function ``SPIWrite`` will write unencrypted to flash. (these function are not supported in esp-idf apps).
The minimum write size for unencrypted data is 4 bytes (and the alignment is 4 bytes). Because data is encrypted in blocks, the minimum write size for encrypted data is 16 bytes (and the alignment is 16 bytes.)
Provided secure boot is not used, the :ref:`FLASH_CRYPT_CNT` allows the flash to be updated with new plaintext data via serial flashing (or other physical methods), up to 3 additional times.
The process involves flashing plaintext data, and then bumping the value of :ref:`FLASH_CRYPT_CNT` which causes the bootloader to re-encrypt this data.
- When reflashing via serial, reflash every partition that was initially written with plaintext data (including bootloader). It is possible to skip app partitions which are not the "currently selected" OTA partition (these will not be re-encrypted unless a plaintext app image is found there.) However any partition marked with the "encrypt" flag will be unconditionally re-encrypted, meaning that any already encrypted data will be encrypted twice and corrupted.
- Using ``make flash`` should flash all partitions which need to be flashed.
- If secure boot is enabled, you can't reflash via serial at all unless you used the "Reflashable" option for Secure Boot, pre-generated a key and burned it to the ESP32 (refer to :doc:`Secure Boot <secure-boot>` docs.). In this case you can re-flash a plaintext secure boot digest and bootloader image at offset 0x0. It is necessary to re-flash this digest before flashing other plaintext data.
- Flash the device with plaintext data as usual (``make flash`` or ``esptool.py`` commands.) Flash all previously encrypted partitions, including the bootloader (see previous section).
- At this point, the device will fail to boot (message is ``flash read err, 1000``) because it expects to see an encrypted bootloader, but the bootloader is plaintext.
- Burn the :ref:`FLASH_CRYPT_CNT` by running the command ``espefuse.py burn_efuse FLASH_CRYPT_CNT``. espefuse.py will automatically increment the bit count by 1, which disables encryption.
To prevent further plaintext updates via serial, use espefuse.py to write protect the :ref:`FLASH_CRYPT_CNT` after flash encryption has been enabled (ie after first boot is complete)::
It is possible to pregenerate a flash encryption key on the host computer and burn it into the ESP32's efuse key block. This allows data to be pre-encrypted on the host and flashed to the ESP32 without needing a plaintext flash update.
This is useful for development, because it removes the 4 time reflashing limit. It also allows reflashing with secure boot enabled, because the bootloader doesn't need to be reflashed each time.
**IMPORTANT This method is intended to assist with development only, not for production devices. If pre-generating flash encryption for production, ensure the keys are generated from a high quality random number source and do not share the same flash encryption key across multiple devices.**
Pregenerating a Flash Encryption Key
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Flash encryption keys are 32 bytes of random data. You can generate a random key with espsecure.py::
(The randomness of this data is only as good as the OS and it's Python installation's random data source.)
Alternatively, if you're using :doc:`secure boot <secure-boot>` and have a secure boot signing key then you can generate a deterministic SHA-256 digest of the secure boot private signing key and use this as the flash encryption key::
(The same 32 bytes is used as the secure boot digest key if you enable :ref:`reflashable mode<secure-boot-reflashable>` for secure boot.)
Generating the flash encryption key from the secure boot signing key in this way means that you only need to store one key file. However this method is **not at all suitable** for production devices.
Burning Flash Encryption Key
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Once you have generated a flash encryption key, you need to burn it to the ESP32's efuse key block. **This must be done before first encrypted boot**, otherwise the ESP32 will generate a random key that software can't access or modify.
To burn a key to the device (one time only)::
espefuse.py --port PORT burn_key flash_encryption my_flash_encryption_key.bin
First Flash with pregenerated key
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
After flashing the key, follow the same steps as for default :ref:`flash-encryption-initialisation` and flash a plaintext image for the first boot. The bootloader will enable flash encryption using the pre-burned key and encrypt all partitions.
Reflashing with pregenerated key
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
After encryption is enabled on first boot, reflashing an encrypted image requires an additional manual step. This is where we pre-encrypt the data that we wish to update in flash.
Suppose that this is the normal command used to flash plaintext data::
This example command will encrypts ``my-app.bin`` using the supplied key, and produce an encrypted file ``my-app-encrypted.bin``. Be sure that the address argument matches the address where you plan to flash the binary.
Then, flash the encrypted binary with esptool.py::
No further steps or efuse manipulation is necessary, because the data is already encrypted when we flash it.
Disabling Flash Encryption
--------------------------
If you've accidentally enabled flash encryption for some reason, the next flash of plaintext data will soft-brick the ESP32 (the device will reboot continously, printing the error ``flash read err, 1000``).
You can disable flash encryption again by writing :ref:`FLASH_CRYPT_CNT`:
- First, run ``make menuconfig`` and uncheck "Enable flash encryption boot" under "Security Features".
- Exit menuconfig and save the new configuration.
- Run ``make menuconfig`` again and double-check you really disabled this option! *If this option is left enabled, the bootloader will immediately re-enable encryption when it boots*.
- Run ``make flash`` to build and flash a new bootloader and app, without flash encryption enabled.
- Run ``espefuse.py`` (in ``components/esptool_py/esptool``) to disable the :ref:`FLASH_CRYPT_CNT`)::
espefuse.py burn_efuse FLASH_CRYPT_CNT
Reset the ESP32 and flash encryption should be disabled, the bootloader will boot as normal.
Flash Encryption prevents plaintext readout of the encrypted flash, to protect firmware against unauthorised readout and modification. It is important to understand the limitations of the flash encryption system:
- Flash encryption is only as strong as the key. For this reason, we recommend keys are generated on the device during first boot (default behaviour). If generating keys off-device (see :ref:`pregenerated-flash-encryption-key`), ensure proper procedure is followed.
- Flash encryption does not prevent an attacker from understanding the high-level layout of the flash. This is because the same AES key is used for every pair of adjacent 16 byte AES blocks. When these adjacent 16 byte blocks contain identical content (such as empty or padding areas), these blocks will encrypt to produce matching pairs of encrypted blocks. This may allow an attacker to make high-level comparisons between encrypted devices (ie to tell if two devices are probably running the same firmware version).
- For the same reason, an attacker can always tell when a pair of adjacent 16 byte blocks (32 byte aligned) contain identical content. Keep this in mind if storing sensitive data on the flash, design your flash storage so this doesn't happen (using a counter byte or some other non-identical value every 16 bytes is sufficient).
- Flash encryption alone may not prevent an attacker from modifying the firmware of the device. To prevent unauthorised firmware from runningon the device, use flash encryption in combination with :doc:`Secure Boot <secure-boot>`.
Usually left blank, if you write "encrypted" in this field then the partition will be marked as encrypted in the partition table, and data written here will be treated as encrypted (same as an app partition)::
- It is not necessary to mark "app" partitions as encrypted, they are always treated as encrypted.
- The "encrypted" flag does nothing if flash encryption is not enabled.
- It is possible to mark the optional ``phy`` partition with ``phy_init`` data as encrypted, if you wish to protect this data from physical access readout or modification.
- It is not possible to mark the ``nvs`` partition as encrypted.
-``DISABLE_DL_ENCRYPT`` disables the flash encryption operations when running in UART bootloader boot mode.
-``DISABLE_DL_DECRYPT`` disables transparent flash decryption when running in UART bootloader mode, even if :ref:`FLASH_CRYPT_CNT` is set to enable it in normal operation.
-``DISABLE_DL_CACHE`` disables the entire MMU flash cache when running in UART bootloader mode.
It is possible to burn only some of these efuses, and write-protect the rest (with unset value 0) before the first boot, in order to preserve them. For example::
(Note that all 3 of these efuses are disabled via one write protect bit, so write protecting one will write protect all of them. For this reason, it's necessary to set any bits before write-protecting.)
**IMPORTANT**: Write protecting these efuses to keep them unset is not currently very useful, as ``esptool.py`` does not support writing or reading encrypted flash.
**IMPORTANT**: If ``DISABLE_DL_DECRYPT`` is left unset (0) this effectively makes flash encryption useless, as an attacker with physical access can use UART bootloader mode (with custom stub code) to read out the flash contents.
The ``FLASH_CRYPT_CONFIG`` efuse determines the number of bits in the flash encryption key which are "tweaked" with the block offset. See :ref:`flash-encryption-algorithm` for details.
It is possible to write these efuse manually, and write protect it before first boot in order to select different tweak values. This is not recommended.
It is strongly recommended to never write protect ``FLASH_CRYPT_CONFIG`` when it the value is zero. If this efuse is set to zero, no bits in the flash encryption key are tweaked and the flash encryption algorithm is equivalent to AES ECB mode.
``FLASH_CRYPT_CNT`` is an 8-bit efuse field which controls flash encryption. Flash encryption enables or disables based on the number of bits in this efuse which are set to "1":
- If the bootloader was built with "Enable flash encryption on boot" then it will see this situation and immediately re-encrypt the flash wherever it finds unencrypted data. Once done, it sets another bit in the efuse to '1' meaning an odd number of bits are now set.
1. On first plaintext boot, bit count has brand new value 0 and bootloader changes it to bit count 1 (value 0x01) following encryption.
2. After next plaintext flash update, bit count is manually updated to 2 (value 0x03). After re-encrypting the bootloader changes efuse bit count to 3 (value 0x07).
3. After next plaintext flash, bit count is manually updated to 4 (value 0x0F). After re-encrypting the bootloader changes efuse bit count to 5 (value 0x1F).
4. After final plaintext flash, bit count is manually updated to 6 (value 0x3F). After re-encrypting the bootloader changes efuse bit count to 7 (value 0x7F).
- After all 8 bits are set (efuse value 0xFF): Transparent reading of encrypted flash is disabled, any encrypted data is permanently inaccessible. Bootloader will normally detect this condition and halt. To avoid use of this state to load unauthorised code, secure boot must be used or :ref:`FLASH_CRYPT_CNT` must be write-protected.
- AES-256 operates on 16 byte blocks of data. The flash encryption engine encrypts and decrypts data in 32 byte blocks, two AES blocks in series.
- AES algorithm is used inverted in flash encryption, so the flash encryption "encrypt" operation is AES decrypt and the "decrypt" operation is AES encrypt. This is for performance reasons and does not alter the effectiveness of the algorithm.
- Each 32 byte block (two adjacent 16 byte AES blocks) is encrypted with a unique key. The key is derived from the main flash encryption key in efuse, XORed with the offset of this block in the flash (a "key tweak").
- The specific tweak depends on the setting of ``FLASH_CRYPT_CONFIG`` efuse. This is a 4 bit efuse, where each bit enables XORing of a particular range of the key bits:
It is recommended that ``FLASH_CRYPT_CONFIG`` is always left to set the default value `0xF`, so that all key bits are XORed with the block offset. See :ref:`setting-flash-crypt-config` for details.
- The high 19 bits of the block offset (bit 5 to bit 23) are XORed with the main flash encryption key. This range is chosen for two reasons: the maximum flash size is 16MB (24 bits), and each block is 32 bytes so the least significant 5 bits are always zero.
- There is a particular mapping from each of the 19 block offset bits to the 256 bits of the flash encryption key, to determine which bit is XORed with which. See the variable ``_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_TWEAK_PATTERN`` in the espsecure.py source code for the complete mapping.
- To see the full flash encryption algorithm implemented in Python, refer to the `_flash_encryption_operation()` function in the espsecure.py source code.
