kopia lustrzana https://github.com/ryukoposting/Signal-Android
1276 wiersze
37 KiB
C
1276 wiersze
37 KiB
C
/* ssl/t1_enc.c */
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
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*
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* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
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* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
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* license.
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*
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* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
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* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
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* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
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*
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* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
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* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
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* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
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*
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* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
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* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
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* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
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* to make use of the Contribution.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
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* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
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* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
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* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
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* OTHERWISE.
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "ssl_locl.h"
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
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#include <openssl/comp.h>
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#endif
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/hmac.h>
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#include <openssl/md5.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
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#include <openssl/des.h>
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#endif
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/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
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static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
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int sec_len,
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const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
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const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
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const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
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const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
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const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
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unsigned char *out, int olen)
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{
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int chunk;
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size_t j;
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EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp;
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EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
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unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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size_t A1_len;
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int ret = 0;
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chunk=EVP_MD_size(md);
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OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0);
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EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
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EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
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EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
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EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx_tmp, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
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mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len);
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if (!mac_key)
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goto err;
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if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
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goto err;
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if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
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goto err;
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if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
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goto err;
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if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
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goto err;
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if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
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goto err;
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if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
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goto err;
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if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
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goto err;
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if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
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goto err;
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for (;;)
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{
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/* Reinit mac contexts */
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if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
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goto err;
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if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
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goto err;
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if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,A1,A1_len))
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goto err;
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if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx_tmp,A1,A1_len))
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goto err;
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if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
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goto err;
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if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
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goto err;
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if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
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goto err;
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if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
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goto err;
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if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
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goto err;
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if (olen > chunk)
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{
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if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,out,&j))
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goto err;
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out+=j;
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olen-=j;
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/* calc the next A1 value */
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if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len))
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goto err;
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}
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else /* last one */
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{
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if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
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goto err;
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memcpy(out,A1,olen);
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break;
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}
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}
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ret = 1;
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err:
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EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
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EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
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EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
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OPENSSL_cleanse(A1,sizeof(A1));
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return ret;
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}
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/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
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static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask,
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const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
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const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
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const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
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const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
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const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
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const unsigned char *sec, int slen,
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unsigned char *out1,
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unsigned char *out2, int olen)
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{
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int len,i,idx,count;
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const unsigned char *S1;
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long m;
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const EVP_MD *md;
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int ret = 0;
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/* Count number of digests and partition sec evenly */
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count=0;
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for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) {
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if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) count++;
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}
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len=slen/count;
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if (count == 1)
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slen = 0;
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S1=sec;
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memset(out1,0,olen);
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for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) {
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if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) {
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if (!md) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF,
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SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE);
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goto err;
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}
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if (!tls1_P_hash(md ,S1,len+(slen&1),
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seed1,seed1_len,seed2,seed2_len,seed3,seed3_len,seed4,seed4_len,seed5,seed5_len,
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out2,olen))
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goto err;
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S1+=len;
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for (i=0; i<olen; i++)
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{
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out1[i]^=out2[i];
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}
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}
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}
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ret = 1;
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err:
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return ret;
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}
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static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km,
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unsigned char *tmp, int num)
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{
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int ret;
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ret = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
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TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE,
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s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
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s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
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NULL,0,NULL,0,
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s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
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km,tmp,num);
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#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
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printf("tls1_generate_key_block() ==> %d byte master_key =\n\t",
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s->session->master_key_length);
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{
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int i;
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for (i=0; i < s->session->master_key_length; i++)
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{
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printf("%02X", s->session->master_key[i]);
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}
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printf("\n"); }
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#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
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return ret;
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}
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int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
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{
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static const unsigned char empty[]="";
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unsigned char *p,*mac_secret;
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unsigned char *exp_label;
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unsigned char tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
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unsigned char tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
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unsigned char iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2];
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unsigned char iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2];
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unsigned char *ms,*key,*iv;
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int client_write;
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
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const EVP_CIPHER *c;
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
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const SSL_COMP *comp;
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#endif
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const EVP_MD *m;
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int mac_type;
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int *mac_secret_size;
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EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx;
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EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
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int is_export,n,i,j,k,exp_label_len,cl;
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int reuse_dd = 0;
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is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
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c=s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
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m=s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
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mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type;
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
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comp=s->s3->tmp.new_compression;
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#endif
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#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
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printf("tls1_change_cipher_state(which= %d) w/\n", which);
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printf("\talg= %ld/%ld, comp= %p\n",
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s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
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s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth,
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comp);
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printf("\tevp_cipher == %p ==? &d_cbc_ede_cipher3\n", c);
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printf("\tevp_cipher: nid, blksz= %d, %d, keylen=%d, ivlen=%d\n",
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c->nid,c->block_size,c->key_len,c->iv_len);
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printf("\tkey_block: len= %d, data= ", s->s3->tmp.key_block_length);
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{
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int i;
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for (i=0; i<s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++)
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printf("%02x", s->s3->tmp.key_block[i]); printf("\n");
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}
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#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
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if (which & SSL3_CC_READ)
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{
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if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
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s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
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else
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s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
|
|
|
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if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
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reuse_dd = 1;
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else if ((s->enc_read_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
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goto err;
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else
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/* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx);
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dd= s->enc_read_ctx;
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mac_ctx=ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash,NULL);
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
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if (s->expand != NULL)
|
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{
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COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
|
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s->expand=NULL;
|
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}
|
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if (comp != NULL)
|
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{
|
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s->expand=COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
|
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if (s->expand == NULL)
|
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{
|
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
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goto err2;
|
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}
|
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if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
|
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s->s3->rrec.comp=(unsigned char *)
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OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH);
|
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if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
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goto err;
|
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}
|
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#endif
|
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/* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION */
|
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if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
|
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memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]),0,8);
|
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mac_secret= &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
|
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mac_secret_size=&(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size);
|
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}
|
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else
|
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{
|
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if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
|
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s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
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else
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s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
|
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if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
|
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reuse_dd = 1;
|
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else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
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goto err;
|
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dd= s->enc_write_ctx;
|
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if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
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{
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mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
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if (!mac_ctx)
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goto err;
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s->write_hash = mac_ctx;
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}
|
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else
|
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mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash,NULL);
|
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
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if (s->compress != NULL)
|
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{
|
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COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
|
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s->compress=NULL;
|
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}
|
|
if (comp != NULL)
|
|
{
|
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s->compress=COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
|
|
if (s->compress == NULL)
|
|
{
|
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
|
|
goto err2;
|
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}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
/* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION */
|
|
if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
|
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memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]),0,8);
|
|
mac_secret= &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
|
|
mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret_size);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (reuse_dd)
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(dd);
|
|
|
|
p=s->s3->tmp.key_block;
|
|
i=*mac_secret_size=s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
|
|
|
|
cl=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
|
|
j=is_export ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
|
|
cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
|
|
/* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
|
|
/* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */
|
|
if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
|
|
k = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
|
|
else
|
|
k=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
|
|
if ( (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
|
|
(which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
|
|
{
|
|
ms= &(p[ 0]); n=i+i;
|
|
key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+j;
|
|
iv= &(p[ n]); n+=k+k;
|
|
exp_label=(unsigned char *)TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
|
|
exp_label_len=TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
|
|
client_write=1;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
n=i;
|
|
ms= &(p[ n]); n+=i+j;
|
|
key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+k;
|
|
iv= &(p[ n]); n+=k;
|
|
exp_label=(unsigned char *)TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
|
|
exp_label_len=TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
|
|
client_write=0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(mac_secret,ms,i);
|
|
|
|
if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER))
|
|
{
|
|
mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL,
|
|
mac_secret,*mac_secret_size);
|
|
EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx,NULL,m,NULL,mac_key);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
|
|
printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which);
|
|
{ int z; for (z=0; z<i; z++) printf("%02X%c",ms[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (is_export)
|
|
{
|
|
/* In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the
|
|
* same value since only the correct one will be used :-).
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
|
|
exp_label,exp_label_len,
|
|
s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
|
|
s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
|
|
NULL,0,NULL,0,
|
|
key,j,tmp1,tmp2,EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
|
|
goto err2;
|
|
key=tmp1;
|
|
|
|
if (k > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
|
|
TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST,TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE,
|
|
s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
|
|
s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
|
|
NULL,0,NULL,0,
|
|
empty,0,iv1,iv2,k*2))
|
|
goto err2;
|
|
if (client_write)
|
|
iv=iv1;
|
|
else
|
|
iv= &(iv1[k]);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->session->key_arg_length=0;
|
|
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
printf("EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,key=,iv=,which)\n");
|
|
printf("\tkey= "); for (i=0; i<c->key_len; i++) printf("%02x", key[i]);
|
|
printf("\n");
|
|
printf("\t iv= "); for (i=0; i<c->iv_len; i++) printf("%02x", iv[i]);
|
|
printf("\n");
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,NULL,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,iv,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
|
|
|
|
/* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
|
|
if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size)
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd,EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
|
|
*mac_secret_size,mac_secret);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
|
|
printf("which = %04X\nkey=",which);
|
|
{ int z; for (z=0; z<EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++) printf("%02X%c",key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
|
|
printf("\niv=");
|
|
{ int z; for (z=0; z<k; z++) printf("%02X%c",iv[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
|
|
printf("\n");
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp1,sizeof(tmp1));
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2,sizeof(tmp1));
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(iv1,sizeof(iv1));
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(iv2,sizeof(iv2));
|
|
return(1);
|
|
err:
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
err2:
|
|
return(0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *p1,*p2=NULL;
|
|
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
|
|
const EVP_MD *hash;
|
|
int num;
|
|
SSL_COMP *comp;
|
|
int mac_type= NID_undef,mac_secret_size=0;
|
|
int ret=0;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
|
printf ("tls1_setup_key_block()\n");
|
|
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
|
|
return(1);
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&hash,&mac_type,&mac_secret_size,&comp))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
|
|
return(0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc=c;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_hash=hash;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
|
|
num=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)+mac_secret_size+EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
|
|
num*=2;
|
|
|
|
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
|
|
|
|
if ((p1=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=num;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.key_block=p1;
|
|
|
|
if ((p2=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
|
|
printf("client random\n");
|
|
{ int z; for (z=0; z<SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->s3->client_random[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
|
|
printf("server random\n");
|
|
{ int z; for (z=0; z<SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->s3->server_random[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
|
|
printf("pre-master\n");
|
|
{ int z; for (z=0; z<s->session->master_key_length; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->session->master_key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s,p1,p2,num))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
|
|
printf("\nkey block\n");
|
|
{ int z; for (z=0; z<num; z++) printf("%02X%c",p1[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION &&
|
|
(s->mode & SSL_MODE_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
/* enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with
|
|
* known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
|
|
*/
|
|
s->s3->need_record_splitting = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
|
|
s->s3->need_record_splitting = 0;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
|
|
if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
|
|
s->s3->need_record_splitting = 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
err:
|
|
if (p2)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(p2,num);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(p2);
|
|
}
|
|
return(ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns:
|
|
* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
|
|
* short etc).
|
|
* 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
|
|
* -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
|
|
* an internal error occured.
|
|
*/
|
|
int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL3_RECORD *rec;
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
|
|
unsigned long l;
|
|
int bs,i,j,k,pad=0,ret,mac_size=0;
|
|
const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
|
|
|
|
if (send)
|
|
{
|
|
if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash))
|
|
{
|
|
int n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
|
|
}
|
|
ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
|
|
rec= &(s->s3->wrec);
|
|
if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
|
|
enc=NULL;
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
int ivlen;
|
|
enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
|
|
/* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
|
|
if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION
|
|
&& EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
|
|
ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc);
|
|
else
|
|
ivlen = 0;
|
|
if (ivlen > 1)
|
|
{
|
|
if ( rec->data != rec->input)
|
|
/* we can't write into the input stream:
|
|
* Can this ever happen?? (steve)
|
|
*/
|
|
fprintf(stderr,
|
|
"%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n",
|
|
__FILE__, __LINE__);
|
|
else if (RAND_bytes(rec->input, ivlen) <= 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash))
|
|
{
|
|
int n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
|
|
}
|
|
ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
|
|
rec= &(s->s3->rrec);
|
|
if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
|
|
enc=NULL;
|
|
else
|
|
enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
|
printf("tls1_enc(%d)\n", send);
|
|
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
|
|
|
if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL))
|
|
{
|
|
memmove(rec->data,rec->input,rec->length);
|
|
rec->input=rec->data;
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
l=rec->length;
|
|
bs=EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char buf[13],*seq;
|
|
|
|
seq = send?s->s3->write_sequence:s->s3->read_sequence;
|
|
|
|
if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char dtlsseq[9],*p=dtlsseq;
|
|
|
|
s2n(send?s->d1->w_epoch:s->d1->r_epoch,p);
|
|
memcpy(p,&seq[2],6);
|
|
memcpy(buf,dtlsseq,8);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
memcpy(buf,seq,8);
|
|
for (i=7; i>=0; i--) /* increment */
|
|
{
|
|
++seq[i];
|
|
if (seq[i] != 0) break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
buf[8]=rec->type;
|
|
buf[9]=(unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
|
|
buf[10]=(unsigned char)(s->version);
|
|
buf[11]=rec->length>>8;
|
|
buf[12]=rec->length&0xff;
|
|
pad=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds,EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,13,buf);
|
|
if (send)
|
|
{
|
|
l+=pad;
|
|
rec->length+=pad;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else if ((bs != 1) && send)
|
|
{
|
|
i=bs-((int)l%bs);
|
|
|
|
/* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */
|
|
|
|
/* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */
|
|
j=i-1;
|
|
if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
|
|
j++;
|
|
}
|
|
for (k=(int)l; k<(int)(l+i); k++)
|
|
rec->input[k]=j;
|
|
l+=i;
|
|
rec->length+=i;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned long ui;
|
|
printf("EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n",
|
|
ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
|
|
printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%d %d], %d iv_len\n",
|
|
ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
|
|
DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
|
|
ds->cipher->iv_len);
|
|
printf("\t\tIV: ");
|
|
for (i=0; i<ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) printf("%02X", ds->iv[i]);
|
|
printf("\n");
|
|
printf("\trec->input=");
|
|
for (ui=0; ui<l; ui++) printf(" %02x", rec->input[ui]);
|
|
printf("\n");
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
|
|
|
if (!send)
|
|
{
|
|
if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
i = EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
|
|
if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER)
|
|
?(i<0)
|
|
:(i==0))
|
|
return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
|
|
if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send)
|
|
{
|
|
rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
|
|
rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
|
|
rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned long i;
|
|
printf("\trec->data=");
|
|
for (i=0; i<l; i++)
|
|
printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]); printf("\n");
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
|
|
mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
|
|
if ((bs != 1) && !send)
|
|
ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
|
|
if (pad && !send)
|
|
rec->length -= pad;
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int ret;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d=NULL;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
|
|
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
for (i=0;i<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;i++)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]&&EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i])==md_nid)
|
|
{
|
|
d=s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!d) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC,SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,d);
|
|
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,out,&ret);
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
|
return((int)ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* tls1_handshake_digest calculates the current handshake hash and writes it to
|
|
* |out|, which has space for |out_len| bytes. It returns the number of bytes
|
|
* written or -1 in the event of an error. This function works on a copy of the
|
|
* underlying digests so can be called multiple times and prior to the final
|
|
* update etc. */
|
|
int tls1_handshake_digest(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t out_len)
|
|
{
|
|
const EVP_MD *md;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
|
|
int i, err = 0, len = 0;
|
|
long mask;
|
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(i, &mask, &md); i++)
|
|
{
|
|
int hash_size;
|
|
unsigned int digest_len;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
|
|
|
|
if ((mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s)) == 0)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
hash_size = EVP_MD_size(md);
|
|
if (!hdgst || hash_size < 0 || (size_t)hash_size > out_len)
|
|
{
|
|
err = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) ||
|
|
!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &digest_len) ||
|
|
digest_len != (unsigned int)hash_size) /* internal error */
|
|
{
|
|
err = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
out += digest_len;
|
|
out_len -= digest_len;
|
|
len += digest_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (err != 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
return len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
|
|
const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char buf[2*EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
unsigned char buf2[12];
|
|
int err=0;
|
|
int digests_len;
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
|
|
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
digests_len = tls1_handshake_digest(s, buf, sizeof(buf));
|
|
if (digests_len < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
err = 1;
|
|
digests_len = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
|
|
str,slen, buf, digests_len, NULL,0, NULL,0, NULL,0,
|
|
s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
|
|
out,buf2,sizeof buf2))
|
|
err = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
else
|
|
return sizeof buf2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL3_RECORD *rec;
|
|
unsigned char *seq;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
|
|
size_t md_size, orig_len;
|
|
int i;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx;
|
|
unsigned char header[13];
|
|
int stream_mac = (send?(ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM):(ssl->mac_flags&SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM));
|
|
int t;
|
|
|
|
if (send)
|
|
{
|
|
rec= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
|
|
seq= &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]);
|
|
hash=ssl->write_hash;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
rec= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
|
|
seq= &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]);
|
|
hash=ssl->read_hash;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
|
|
md_size=t;
|
|
|
|
/* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
|
|
if (stream_mac)
|
|
{
|
|
mac_ctx = hash;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac,hash))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
mac_ctx = &hmac;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION || ssl->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char dtlsseq[8],*p=dtlsseq;
|
|
|
|
s2n(send?ssl->d1->w_epoch:ssl->d1->r_epoch, p);
|
|
memcpy (p,&seq[2],6);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
memcpy(header, seq, 8);
|
|
|
|
/* kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */
|
|
orig_len = rec->length+md_size+((unsigned int)rec->type>>8);
|
|
rec->type &= 0xff;
|
|
|
|
header[8]=rec->type;
|
|
header[9]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8);
|
|
header[10]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version);
|
|
header[11]=(rec->length)>>8;
|
|
header[12]=(rec->length)&0xff;
|
|
|
|
if (!send &&
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
|
|
ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx))
|
|
{
|
|
/* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
|
|
* timing-side channel information about how many blocks of
|
|
* data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a
|
|
* timing-oracle. */
|
|
ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
|
|
mac_ctx,
|
|
md, &md_size,
|
|
header, rec->input,
|
|
rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
|
|
ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
|
|
ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size,
|
|
0 /* not SSLv3 */);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,header,sizeof(header));
|
|
EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
|
|
t=EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size);
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
|
|
if (!send && FIPS_mode())
|
|
tls_fips_digest_extra(
|
|
ssl->enc_read_ctx,
|
|
mac_ctx, rec->input,
|
|
rec->length, orig_len);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!stream_mac)
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
|
|
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
|
|
printf("seq=");
|
|
{int z; for (z=0; z<8; z++) printf("%02X ",seq[z]); printf("\n"); }
|
|
printf("rec=");
|
|
{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rec->length; z++) printf("%02X ",rec->data[z]); printf("\n"); }
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->version != DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
|
|
{
|
|
for (i=7; i>=0; i--)
|
|
{
|
|
++seq[i];
|
|
if (seq[i] != 0) break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
|
|
{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",md[z]); printf("\n"); }
|
|
#endif
|
|
return(md_size);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
|
|
int len)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
|
|
const void *co = NULL, *so = NULL;
|
|
int col = 0, sol = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
|
printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s,out, p,len);
|
|
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
|
|
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
|
|
s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len > 0 &&
|
|
s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
|
|
{
|
|
co = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input;
|
|
col = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
|
|
so = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input;
|
|
sol = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; /* must be same as col (see draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt, section 3.1) */
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
|
|
TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
|
|
s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
|
|
co, col,
|
|
s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
|
|
so, sol,
|
|
p,len,
|
|
s->session->master_key,buff,sizeof buff);
|
|
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n");
|
|
BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len);
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "Client Random:\n");
|
|
BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "Server Random:\n");
|
|
BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "Master Secret:\n");
|
|
BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->session->master_key, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
|
printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n");
|
|
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
|
return(SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
|
|
const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context,
|
|
size_t contextlen, int use_context)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *buff;
|
|
unsigned char *val = NULL;
|
|
size_t vallen, currentvalpos;
|
|
int rv;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
|
printf ("tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%d,%s,%d,%p,%d)\n", s, out, olen, label, llen, p, plen);
|
|
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
|
|
|
buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen);
|
|
if (buff == NULL) goto err2;
|
|
|
|
/* construct PRF arguments
|
|
* we construct the PRF argument ourself rather than passing separate
|
|
* values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the concatenation of values
|
|
* does not create a prohibited label.
|
|
*/
|
|
vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2;
|
|
if (use_context)
|
|
{
|
|
vallen += 2 + contextlen;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen);
|
|
if (val == NULL) goto err2;
|
|
currentvalpos = 0;
|
|
memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *) label, llen);
|
|
currentvalpos += llen;
|
|
memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
|
|
memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
if (use_context)
|
|
{
|
|
val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff;
|
|
currentvalpos++;
|
|
val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff;
|
|
currentvalpos++;
|
|
if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL))
|
|
{
|
|
memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* disallow prohibited labels
|
|
* note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited label len) =
|
|
* 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and the
|
|
* comparisons won't have buffer overflow
|
|
*/
|
|
if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,
|
|
TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
|
|
if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,
|
|
TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
|
|
if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
|
|
TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
|
|
if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
|
|
TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
|
|
|
|
rv = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
|
|
val, vallen,
|
|
NULL, 0,
|
|
NULL, 0,
|
|
NULL, 0,
|
|
NULL, 0,
|
|
s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
|
|
out,buff,olen);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
|
printf ("tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n");
|
|
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
|
goto ret;
|
|
err1:
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
|
|
rv = 0;
|
|
goto ret;
|
|
err2:
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
rv = 0;
|
|
ret:
|
|
if (buff != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buff);
|
|
if (val != NULL) OPENSSL_free(val);
|
|
return(rv);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls1_alert_code(int code)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (code)
|
|
{
|
|
case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY: return(SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
|
|
case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: return(SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC: return(SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
|
|
case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED: return(TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
|
case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW: return(TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW);
|
|
case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:return(SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
|
|
case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE: return(-1);
|
|
case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE: return(SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
|
|
case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:return(SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
|
|
case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
|
|
case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED);
|
|
case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN);
|
|
case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER: return(SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
|
|
case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA: return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA);
|
|
case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED: return(TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED);
|
|
case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR: return(TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
|
case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR: return(TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
|
|
case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION: return(TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION);
|
|
case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION: return(TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
|
|
case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:return(TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY);
|
|
case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: return(TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED: return(TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED);
|
|
case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: return(TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
|
|
case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: return(TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION);
|
|
case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: return(TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE);
|
|
case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME: return(TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME);
|
|
case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
|
|
case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE);
|
|
case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
|
|
#if 0 /* not appropriate for TLS, not used for DTLS */
|
|
case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE: return
|
|
(DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
|
|
#endif
|
|
default: return(-1);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|